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Abstract
This essay considers physical daguerreotype cases from the 1840s and
1850s alongside scholarly debate on case studies, or “thinking in cases”, and
some recent physicalist claims about objects in cultural theory, particularly
those associated with “new materialism”. Throughout the essay, these three
distinct strands are braided together to interrogate particular objects and
broader questions of cultural history. It contributes to thinking about
daguerreotypes and their cases, but it does so in order to interrogate
thinking in cases and objecthood as a legal category. I argue that
daguerreotypes have to be understood as image-thing amalgams, paying
particular attention to the construction and distinguishing marks on the
cases and frames that enclose these images. These cases, particularly those
of the patent holder Richard Beard, are situated within legal debates on
property and cannot be understood without attention to social relations of
capital and class.
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Object Cases
Art historians do not know what to do with daguerreotypes. Tens of
thousands of these ordinary images were made in Britain between 1841,
when the first studios were established in London by Richard Beard and
Antoine Claudet, and the later 1850s, at which point the process largely went
out of use. Ninety-five per cent of these items, perhaps more, were simple
portraits of the middle class. 1 Relatively few of these objects have entered
museum collections, which until recently have been preoccupied with
collecting “fine photographs”, rather than this kind of commodity image. In
this essay, drawing on extensive examinations of objects, I attend to English
daguerreotype cases with a degree of attention usually reserved for pictures
or texts, relegating the images to the background. My essay seeks to
combine a perverse connoisseurship—involving a detailed comparative study
of banal commodities—with a critical account of legal cases, situating a
warped art-historical ekphrasis in the mesh of the law. This article provides a
more detailed description of daguerreotypes and their cases than those
previously attempted, but it is not limited to this task. The aim is
simultaneously to deploy these object cases as a tool or lens for thinking
about some current approaches to art and cultural history. In particular, I
raise issues about property and law that complicate some recent ideas about
non-human things and the networks they elicit. The approach taken here
involves switching focus at various points shifting from daguerreotype cases,
to consider the intellectual assumptions underpinning case studies and an
engagement with legal definitions of property. Hopefully, the weaving
together of these seemingly distinct issues—daguerreotype cases, case
study methods, and definitions of property—will prove illuminating and
contribute to our understanding of cultural objects.
Of late, the study of photographs has moved beyond art history to
encompass a range of disciplines and consideration of commercial images
has come more to the fore. 2 Nevertheless, the history of the daguerreotype
remains tangential to these concerns. Traditionally, writers on photography
have treated daguerreotypes as pictures—cropping them in reproduction to
the edge of the mat or even stripping the mat and presenting them as
detached plates. In this virtual sleight of hand, cases are discarded from the
visual field and sometimes actually discarded. Some of the newer histories of
photography are not so dissimilar: whatever their theoretical differences
from the older histories, they too treat daguerreotypes as pictures. 3
In wider debates on photography, attitudes have changed considerably, with
attention often falling on the seemingly marginal presentational forms of
photography. The anthropologist Elizabeth Edwards, whose work has been
central to this reorientation in photographic studies, observes that while
photographs have been regarded as images and addressed through theories
of representation, there has recently “been an increasing amount of work on
photography and the multisensory image”. 4 Edwards’ point is that a focus
on representation and the semiotics of the image has largely ignored the
ways that photographs are used and presented in albums, mounts, frames,
or shoeboxes. In contrast, she advocates a multi-sensory approach that
engages with photographs as a “tactile archive” and addresses their
imbrication in other technologies of capture, storage, and retrieval. This
perspective finds its place in object-orientated cultural studies and Edwards’
own work on photographic mounts and storage boxes is an outstanding
example of such work. 5
I have strong reservations about the so-called “new materialism”, which sits
behind much of this newer work on photographic objecthood (both for its
marginalisation of image studies and the grander theoretical claims, which
sidestep the role of social power in human relations and collapse distinctions
between people and nature). 6 Some of my criticisms of this theoretical
armature will emerge in the course of this essay, but thinking about
photographs as material objects that affect historical events and processes
has been highly productive. My text is offered as a contribution to
understanding the “tactile archive”, but it is predicated on a different
understanding of materialism. 7 In fact, no daguerreotype could ever possibly
have existed as a picture: daguerreotypes are not images but things or
object-image amalgams (Fig. 1). 8 This is true for all images, whether framed,
printed, projected, or instantiated via a screen, but daguerreotypes offer a
particularly illuminating case study, pointing to the way that the law enfolds
all objects.
Figure 1.
Selection of daguerreotypes in the author’s collection, photographed in
2020. Digital image courtesy of Matthew Hollow.
The daguerreotype process is chemically very stable. Plates tarnish on
exposure to air but, unlike the paper prints of the same period, they do not
fade or fox; 170 years after they were made, they remain sharp and, turned
in the hand, still reveal the “delicate-grey picture” that entranced Walter
Benjamin. 9 However, while the process is remarkably stable, the mercury
crystals on the surface of the plate are incredibly fragile and physical contact
will easily wipe away the image. As a consequence, daguerreotype plates
always require protection from contact and they are usually presented under
glass and contained in cases or, more rarely in Britain, in frames. The
silvered plate is combined with a mat and a glass sheet to form a triple-
layered “sandwich”, which is bound together with gummed paper or catgut
(Fig. 2). The gilt mat not only provides an image-frame but it also serves the
practical purpose of preventing the image-surface of the plate from coming
into contact with the protective covering. This sandwich is sometimes
inserted into a pan, or tray, for extra protection, before being introduced to
the case or frame. On rare occasions, the case is also lined with tin as an
additional safeguard (Fig. 3). 10 During the 1850s, a decorative brass
“preserver” was introduced, probably as an American innovation, which
covers the front edge of the glass and wraps around the sandwich (a
preserver is visible in Fig. 38). Cases protect their images and allow for easy
storage and transport—as with other fetish forms, this enables them to be
held close to the body in a pocket, bag, or locket—but the traces and signs
they bear are also integral to daguerreotypes. 11 These artefacts cannot be
understood without attending to their cases, but the only available studies of
these key components of the daguerreotype are books for collectors, or
studies by historians of an antiquarian bent, presenting examples. 12 As we
will see, while these case features serve the practical role of protecting
pictures made from mercury crystals, they are also legal marks of property
and this must shape our approach to these artefacts.
Figure 2.
Beard Patentee, Elements of the “sandwich”: plate, mat and
glass, ninth-plate, circa 1842, 2 x 2½ in. Collection of Steve
Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 3.
Ninth-plate, flip-top case with tin
lining, 2 x 2½ in. Collection of
Steve Edwards. Digital image
courtesy of Steve Edwards.
While examples by other makers will be discussed,
focus here falls on the daguerreotypes produced in
the studios of Richard Beard, who was the patent
holder for the daguerreotype in the “territory of
England, Wales and Berwick-upon-Tweed” (Figs 4
and 5). This is because, as I have argued
elsewhere, under patent law, Beard was entitled to
license others to operate in his name and he
could, and did, specify the components that could
be used and how these commodities appeared.
Beard largely determined the form daguerreotypes
took throughout his patent territory. This legal
control produced a situation in which
daguerreotypes produced by hundreds of studios
throughout the territory were basically
interchangeable and should be identified as the
work of a collective producer called “Beard
Patentee”; this was a form of dispersed authorship
under a proper name. 13
Figure 4.
Beard Patentee, Portrait of a Woman, hand-coloured sixth plate, second
half of the 1840s, 2¾ x 3¼ in. Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image
courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 5.
Sixth-plate case (back face) stamped with Beard’s insignia, Collection
of Steve Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Daguerreotype Cases
Two types of case were common for housing daguerreotypes: the earliest are
flip-top cases that contained ninth-plate daguerreotypes; slightly later, book-
style cases were employed to contain various plate sizes (Figs 6, 7 and 8).
Throughout much of Europe, daguerreotypes appeared in passé-partout
frames, rather than cases (Fig. 9).
Figure 6.
Anon., Graduation Portrait, ninth plate in book type case, second half of
1840s. Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve
Edwards.
Figure 7.
Beard Patentee, Portrait of a
Woman in Plain Dress (of the
Jowett-Wilson Family of
Manufacturers, Leeds), ninth
plate, circa 1841–1843, 2 x 2½
in. Collection of Steve Edwards.
Digital image courtesy of Steve
Edwards.
View this illustration online
Figure 8.
Daguerreotype Cases, film, 2020. Digital file courtesy of Matthew Hollow.
View this illustration online
Figure 9.
Daguerreotype Frames, film, 2020. Digital file courtesy of Matthew Hollow.
Historians of photography have largely ignored these widely-produced
images and we do not know nearly enough about the production of these
integral-objects. Cases of this type long pre-dated daguerreotypes and were
used for housing miniature paintings and items of personal jewellery. In the
first instance, daguerreotype cases were probably adopted and adapted from
these pre-existing items, establishing continuity with the long tradition of
English miniature art and association with precious objects. However, due to
the thickness of the tripartite sandwich, a deeper case was ideally suited to
housing them and, before long, these began to be produced specially for the
task. One good account of case fabrication does exist; this is Edward
Anthony’s description of large-scale daguerreotype production in his New
York manufactory (Fig. 10). Anthony’s New York establishment employed a
complex division of labour, including the sexual division of labour, and
labour-saving technologies combined with motive power; he claimed that,
before completion, every case had been subject to at least twenty distinct
labour tasks. 14 I have been unable to find any equivalent account of case
making in existence for Britain and it seems unlikely that these features of
the American system of production were employed. In Britain, daguerreotype
cases were probably made at the bench in small workshops, using simple
hand tools. Beard maintained a London “manufactory” at Wharf Road, City
Road, Islington to produce Wolcott reflecting cameras and supply his studio
network with chemicals and other materials; and while it is possible that his
cases were made there, it is more likely that he obtained them from the West
Midlands manufacturers, who supplied him with other key components such
as plates, mats, and pans. 15 The most likely source was the manufacturer
Thomas Wharton. 16 During the 1850s, some case manufacturers advertised
in the photographic press and we learn from these that prices ranged from
15s. per dozen for ninth-plate cases, while mats began at 2s. per dozen.
Passé-partout frames started from 2s. each, rising to a pound per frame. 17
These items were not cheap! All in all, little can be discovered from written
sources and we need to turn to surviving cased images.
Figure 10.
Edward Anthony, Case Factory-Gilding Room, engraving, 1854. Digital
image courtesy of Bard Graduate Center (all rights reserved).
Prior to 1844, Beard employed the patent Wolcott camera, which had a
reflecting mirror, rather than a lens. 18 This device speeded up exposure
times for portraits but, because of the limited zone of focus, it was only
possible to produce ninth plates with the Wolcott apparatus. As such, Beard’s
early daguerreotypes were invariably ninth plates, housed in red-leather flip-
top cases. In the latter part of 1841, or early in 1842, he began to employ a
range of mats for use in his daguerreotype sandwiches. It would help greatly
to have a full morphology for these components, but we are only now
groping towards itemising those that were available. From the known Beard
mats, it seems likely that each design was available with either an oval or
rectangular aperture (Figs. 11–14).
Figure 11.
Beard Patentee, Portrait of a
Woman, ninth plate, 1841–1843, 2
x 2½ in. Collection of Steve
Edwards. Digital image courtesy
of Steve Edwards.
Figure 12.
Beard Patentee, Portrait of a Man,
ninth plate, 1841–1843, 2 x 2½ in.
Collection of Steve Edwards.
Digital image courtesy of Steve
Edwards.
Figure 13.
Beard Patentee, Portrait of a
Woman, ninth plate, circa
1841–1843, 2 x 2½ in. Collection
of Steve Edwards. Digital image
courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 14.
Beard Patentee, Portrait of a
Man, ninth plate, 1844–1845, 2
x 2½ in. Collection of Steve
Edwards. Digital image
courtesy of Steve Edwards.
View this illustration online
Figure 15.
Daguerreotype Mats and Packs, film, 2020. Digital file courtesy of
Matthew Hollow.
Beard also offered a range of decorative or fancy
mats. These items served a decorative function but
they also enlarged the surround of ninth-plate
daguerreotypes filling out a larger case and giving
the object a more substantial feel in the hand (Fig.
15). Several variant mats appear in these “luxury
packs” (Figs 16–20). Customers probably selected
the mat they wanted by price from a list, adapting
the portrait-commodity to their taste and their
purse. In their influential account of “flexible
production”, Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin
argue that this kind of variability in components
offered a viable alternative to mass production,
particularly in trades subject to changing fashions.
19 Flexible production allowed commodities to be
adapted and repackaged without the expensive
investment in fixed capital. In this way, small
producers could modify and diversify their wares to
suit fickle patterns of taste using simple,
interchangeable components. At the same time that
he was using stamped mats, Beard also enclosed
his daguerreotype sandwiches in a pan marked with
Thomas Wharton’s 1841 design registration. The
Wharton pan was exclusive to Beard and any
daguerreotype in such a pan must come from one
of his studios (Fig. 21). 20 In 1844, Beard ceased to
use stamped mats and Wharton pans and other
marks appear on his cases, including gilt stamps announcing his studios and,
sometimes, a handwritten signature label inside the case, under the
sandwich (Figs 22–26).
Figure 16.
Beard Patentee, Portrait of a Man,
ninth plate in luxury pack, mat
floral design with oval aperture,
1841–1843, 2 x 2½ in. Collection
of Steve Edwards. Digital image
courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 17.
Beard Patentee, Portrait of a Man, ninth plate in luxury pack, mat
floral design with rectangular aperture, 1841–1843 (a variant with a
Beard Patentee embossed cartouche at bottom), 2 x 2½ in. Collection
of Steve Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 18.
Beard Patentee, Portrait of a Man,
large ninth plate in luxury lined
mat pack, 1841–1843, 2 x 2½ in.
Collection of Steve Edwards.
Digital image courtesy of Steve
Edwards.
Figure 19.
Beard Patentee, The Montague Children, large ninth plate in luxury pack,
etched mat with four floral corner motifs, 1843, 2 x 2½ in. Collection of
Steve Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 20.
Beard Patentee, Portrait of a
Man, ninth plate, fancy vine scroll
mat, 1841–1843, 2 x 2½ in.
Collection of Steve Edwards.
Digital image courtesy of Steve
Edwards.
Figure 21.
Wharton Pan, Design registration 791, 1841, die-cast brass.
Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve
Edwards.
Figure 22.
Ninth plate case, with Beard
Patentee signature on blue ink
and printed label, after 1843, 2 x
2½ in. Collection of Steve
Edwards. Digital image courtesy
of Steve Edwards.
Figure 23.
Case Insignia, “Beard’s Photographic Institutions. 85 King William
Street, 34 Parliament Street and the Royal Polytechnic Institution,
London and 34 Church Street Liverpool”, second half of the 1840s.
Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve
Edwards.
Figure 24.
Case Insignia, “Beard & Foard’s Photographic Institutions. 14 St
Anne’s Square, Manchester and 34 Church Street Liverpool. Also
at 31 King William St; 34 Parliament Street and the Royal
Polytechnic Institution, London”, early 1850s. Collection of Steve
Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 25.
Beard Patentee, Portrait of a Man (shown in case), hand-coloured ninth
plate, later 1840s, 2 x 2½ in. with imported Christofle plate over-stamped
“Beard”. Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve
Edwards.
Figure 26.
Beard Patentee, Portrait of a Man (detail of imported Christofle plate over-
stamped “Beard”), hand-coloured ninth plate, later 1840s, 2 x 2½ in.
Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Beard also sold daguerreotypes in frames. Briefly stated, such frames bear
five distinguishing features, which appear in all permutations (Figs 27, 28,
and 29).
Figure 27.
Detail of fragment of a Beard advertising label found under a hand-
coloured sixth plate, made by a Beard Patentee, late 1840s or early
1850s, 2¾ x 3¼ in. Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image courtesy of
Steve Edwards.
Figure 28.
Beard Patentee, Portrait of a Woman, ninth plate in a japanned frame with
dolphin and pheasant ormolu design, 1842, 2 x 2½ in. Collection of Steve
Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Matthew Hollow.
View this illustration online
Figure 29.
Distinguishing Features of Beard's Daguerreotype Frames, film, 2020. Digital
file courtesy of Matthew Hollow.
Case Studies
So, what is a case? Case histories and case studies occupy a prominent role
in approaches to culture and society: from Freud’s “Dora”, “Rat-Man”, and
“Little Hans”, to The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll & Mr Hyde and The Case-Book
of Sherlock Holmes, or Panofsky’s Studies in Iconology, case studies appear
as a structuring mode of knowledge (Fig. 30). 21 There are social science
manuals on case methodology; and legal primers concerned with case law
and medical case histories. Cases also abound in art history and monographs
can be seen as a prime form of the case study. An understanding of the
forms of thought involved in thinking through case studies and the proximity
of this mode to legal procedure will enable a better understanding the
image-objects in question.
Figure 30.
Sigmund Freud’s Couch, Collection Freud Museum London. Digital image
courtesy of Freud Museum, London (all rights reserved)
In recent years “historical epistemologists” have produced compelling
studies of “objectivity”, “evidence”, “trust”, “documents”, “facts”, and other
modes of knowing and presenting but less attention has been paid to what
Fredric J. Schwartz calls “the culture of case”, or what John Forrester
describes as the style of “thinking in cases”. 22 While a host of important
writers have thought in the case form, there are two key points of reference
for considering the epistemology of case studies. The art and cultural
historian, André Jolles included “case” as one of his nine simple words; those
mental dispositions or “gestures” that he believed condensed or congealed
into enduring forms. 23 As Jolles explains in his book Simple Forms, the
“case” is always a matter of judgement or evaluation and therefore a
question of “norms”; the case is the point where “a rule, a legal paragraph,
changes into an event”. 24 We might also say that these norms or rules are
transformed into, or embodied in, objects. It seems fruitful to follow this
suggestion and cross or braid physical object cases with thinking in cases
and legal cases so that they illuminate one another. Jolles knew that he had
to turn to the law to pursue the matter and that the issue did not only apply
to the judgement of individuals but also to the weighing up of norms against
other norms, cases balanced against cases. In this sense, case studies are
examples of what post-Althusserian philosophers call “singularities”, that is,
concrete instances that condense broader patterns or “universals”. 25 This
essay pursues a similar approach.
Alongside Jolles, the best source for thinking about the “culture of the case”
is the work of Michel Foucault. The idea of “examination” appears through
much of Foucault’s work during the 1970s, but it is in Discipline and Punish,
rather than the currently more fashionable late lectures, where he addresses
“the technology of the case”. 26 Foucault’s account of the emergence of a
new conception of criminality and of the homosexual subject during the
nineteenth century is well known. 27 Briefly stated, he argues that a novel
type of subject was defined, whose very identity, or being, is criminal or
homosexual. Before this time, Foucault claims, there were no criminal
subjects, merely people who committed illegal acts; just as there were no
homosexuals, only persons who engaged in prohibited actions with others of
the same sex. The deviant or aberrant criminal, or homosexual, was
produced as a psychological or biological type under the scrutiny of the
disciplines of modern knowledge: anthropology, biology, physiognomy,
psychology, and so forth. This account should be well known to historians of
photography from the work of John Tagg, Allan Sekula, and others, who
mobilised Foucault’s argument to explore the “instrumental images” of the
later nineteenth century. 28 Tagg went as far as to suggest that the camera
could substitute for the carceral complex. 29
What is not observed in the photographic literature is that, for Foucault, the
writing of cases played a crucial role in defining the new regime of subjects.
In Discipline and Punish, he writes: “‘The examination’, surrounded by all its
documentary techniques, makes each individual a ‘case’: a case which at
one and the same time constitutes an object for a branch of knowledge and
a hold for a branch of power”. 30 Distinguishing the case from casuistry or
jurisprudence, he continues, “it is the individual as he may be described,
judged, measured, compared with others, in his very individuality”. 31
Similarly, he wrote that what interested him about the confession at the
heart of I Pierre Rivière, “was that it was a ‘dossier’, that is to say, a case, an
affair, an event that provided the intersection of discourses”. 32 According to
Foucault, the technique of writing and constructing cases is central to the
constitution of new subjectivities. The “case” represents a particular
dispositif that renders criminals, or homosexuals, visible and knowable (Fig.
31). The photograph may take its place as an element in a case file, but the
camera is not a Panopticon.
Figure 31.
Portrait of James Gill, photograph from the Borough of Kendall, Prisoners’
Photograph Book, 1886. Collection of Kendal Archive. Digital image
courtesy of Cumbria Archive Service (all rights reserved).
This is the kind of brilliant account we associate with Foucault. I do not
intend to go over the well-trodden discussion of the strengths and
weaknesses in his account of power, subjectification, and visibility. 33
Foucault is surely right to claim that cases or dossiers entail judgements,
evidence, and individuation. Nonetheless, for the purpose of this analysis, we
are confronted with an apparent problem because it is generally agreed that
the term “case-law” dates from the early 1860s and “case-history” did not
come into common parlance until the later 1870s, after the moment in the
period of daguerreotype production in the 1840s and 1850s under
consideration. However, criminal and medical cases were discussed in the
press considerably earlier. At least from 1820, cases featured in The Morning
Chronicle: “Lord Portsmouth’s Case” or “The Extraordinary Treatment of a
Case of Hydrophobia at Guy’s Hospital”. 34 In “A Lark–Important Case”, we
encounter a discussion of the “law of the case”. 35 John Forrester cites Bishop
Berkeley speaking of a medical case in the 1720s. 36 It seems the technology
of the case was in play earlier than Foucault assumed.
We have James Chandler to thank for tracing out in detail the emergence of
thinking in cases during the period leading up to the daguerreotype patent.
37 Chandler’s big, baggy book on “Romantic historicism” examines the
relation between casuistry and cases, to which Foucault alludes. Both
casuistry and case have their etymological origins in the Latin casus; Jolles
noted this connection. 38 Briefly, casuistry entails a form of moral reasoning
that extends established (religious) principles or rules to new instances.
Chandler’s book follows the development of the case out of casuistry, from
seventeenth-century English Protestantism, through “weighing and
pondering”, to the appearance of the case in the nineteenth-century
historicism. From Adam Smith’s moral philosophy to the post-Waterloo
writings of Bentham, Shelley, Coleridge, De Quincy and, particularly, Sir
Walter Scott, he demonstrates that the language of the case emerges:
“‘general tenor’, ‘particular passages’, ‘context’, ‘application’,
‘circumstances’, ‘temporizing’, ‘falling away’, ‘case’, ‘cause’, ‘conscience’,
and ‘judgment’”. 39 Chandler argues convincingly that the novel of the period
can be seen as a form of secularised case and the term itself is frequently
invoked in Sir Walter Scott’s Redgauntlet, The Heart of Mid-Lothian, and
Ivanhoe. 40 From the second decade on the nineteenth century, cases were
made, stated, weighed, or balanced.
One key difference between Jolles and Foucault is that the former believed
cases are modelled on trials in which an advocate advances a claim,
individuals are cross-examined, witnesses are called, evidence is taken,
appeals made and a judgement proffered, whereas Foucault developed his
account of power-knowledge, and hence the dossier or case, in opposition to
the model of power as law or state form. Nevertheless, a hermeneutics of the
case involves investigations of subjects under particular circumstances of
disease or legal restraint and it seems helpful here to follow Jolles and view
cases as a legal technology. 41 Cases entail both accuser (plaintiff or
prosecutor) and defendant. As the etymology of the term suggests, a case
always involves a point of contingency in which an occurrence befalls an
individual who is, thus, transformed into an example. The case involves the
reduction of a norm to a particular instance, and Forrester argues it came
into focus as an alternative to the statistical thinking that became a central
way of viewing society and nature in the nineteenth century. 42 With
Foucault, we might say the case involves the regulated production of a
singularity. Throughout this discussion, it is possible to observe a separation
or distance, which produces a specialist judgement predicated on an
ideology of neutrality or “objectivity”. 43 The case contributed to the
generating middle-class expertise across the disciplines. 44
If Foucault grasped the central role of the case in producing accounts of
modern subjectivity, the difference between Roman law and the distinct
English legal code throw up problems for transferring his argument directly
to the context of daguerreotype production. Two issues will be highlighted
and they will return us to daguerreotype object cases. First, his argument
does not travel well: the English common law tradition is based on case
histories but is indifferent to subjectivities. The common law tradition
evaluates acts, not motives or psychologies. While the disciplines had plenty
to say about criminality or homosexuality, what they said had little bearing
on legal cases, which attended to acts, not forms of being or subjectivity.
From Foucault’s point of view, the English law is a strangely pre-modern
episteme. Nonetheless, the UK is not an ancien régime. While this legal
tradition may have been wrapped in Latin and the trappings of feudal
landholding, it nevertheless proved remarkably flexible and accommodating
to what political economists and Law Lords alike called “commercial society”.
Second, Foucault’s account passes over “social property relations”; as Molly
Nesbit put it, the “economy is Foucault’s blind spot”. 45 In English case law,
this is not tenable. Subjects, insofar as they exist, are defined via property
claims. My argument is that daguerreotype object cases are also embedded
in legal cases, so this point needs briefly developing. There are three
categories, or estates, of property in English legal thinking: first, and most
important, is fixed or immovable property. 46 Fundamentally, fixed property
involves possession of land or tenement and reflects the predominance of
aristocratic property in legal categories. As Sir William Blackstone, one of the
most influential English Law Lords, put it: “Land comprehends all things of a
permanent, substantial nature”. 47 This is the reason that most forms of
illegal appropriation (theft) are regarded in UK law as forms of trespass on
another’s estate. The possession of land was, until the end of the nineteenth
century, taken to be the guarantee of independence, a stake in the polity
and, therefore, the condition of the franchise. (When middle-class women
over thirty were enfranchised in 1918, it was on the basis of either a stake in
fixed property or higher education.) The second category is chattel property,
which refers to movable property that can be alienated and covers
everything from personal possessions to vendible commodities. It is worth
recalling that, under certain conditions, people can be chattel property, or
enslaved persons, and that self-possession is a particular form of property
right assigned by the law and state. 48 Pace Liberal political philosophy, self-
determination is not an automatic attribute of the subject. It matters who is
counted as a political subject, or citizen, and property has usually been
central to that definition. The third estate of property is immaterial property,
which covers everything from intellectual property to income on
investments, interest on mortgages, or right to tithe payments. Immaterial
Property is a right to intangible or incorporeal property. 49 The idea of
immaterial possession is rooted in Locke’s empirical philosophy of mind and
is elaborated in Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England.
Blackstone again:
Corporeal [property] consist[s] of such as affect the senses; such
as may be seen and handled by the body; incorporeal [things] are
not the object of sensation, can neither be seen nor handled, are
creatures of mind, and only exist in contemplation. 50
We can take as an example patent medicine or patent leather, instances
where legal protection is offered not to the physical pills or shoes (which are
chattels), but to the “recipe” or idea. Similarly, individual daguerreotypes
were the chattel property of their purchasers and could be trespassed
against or stolen, but the right to make them, the incorporeal property in the
daguerreotype process, belonged to Beard and could not be taken from him.
It would be a grave error to treat the objecthood of daguerreotypes, or any
other “thing”, abstracted from property relations. In capitalist societies,
things do not exist on a neutral ontological plane but in and through the
mesh of property law, and this applies whether they are commodities or
uncommodified objects. Before they contribute to establishing networks,
objects are already embedded in social relations.
Beard’s Legal Cases
In the opening paragraph of his “Little History of Photography”, Benjamin
pointed to the central role of patent law in the emergence of photography. 51
Benjamin’s account is factually inaccurate but he was on the case before
others had begun thinking. During the 1840s, Beard conducted six legal
cases in his campaign to secure his daguerreotype property rights for the
territory of “England, Wales and the town of Berwick-upon-Tweed”. 52 Just as
importantly, he stopped others using his property. With the partial exception
of his prosecution of Antoine Claudet (Fig. 32), which he lost on a
technicality, he won all cases and prevented others working. 53 Two cases
were carried out against men he had licensed to use the process—Alfred
Barber of Nottingham and Edward Holland of York—but who could not meet
their scheduled payments (Figs 33–36). 54 Beard entered into three other
lawsuits against persons practising the daguerreotype invention without
“written or verbal leave, license or authority”. 55 In 1842, he pursued a
Chancery suit against Edward Josephs of London (aka Edward Joseph
Edwards), for illegal infringement of his patent; in the following year, he
conducted an action in Chancery against Robert Rankine Bake and William
George Chapple of Truro, Cornwall for “using the apparatus and process
described in the said specification” to take “portraits miniatures likenesses
and representations” and thereby accruing “considerable gains and profits”.
56 Finally, between 1845 and 1849, Beard sought a ruling against the
photographic dealers John Wharry Egerton, Jeremiah Egerton, and Charles
Bates. During the proceedings, Jeremiah Egerton claimed sole responsibility
and conducted a vigorous defence. Beard v Egerton is especially interesting
and involved a protracted legal case. 57 It is doubtful whether Egerton or his
people sold daguerreotypes; he gave lessons and supplied materials, but
Beard believed that this too was illegal. There is a nice legal point here about
whether Egerton was entitled to sell cotton pads, distilled water, iodine,
mercury salts, and silver plates and at what point such everyday items as
these shifted from quantity to quality and became a daguerreotype
apparatus. Beard also tried to prevent the publication of Egerton’s
translation of Lerebours’ instruction manual to the daguerreotype process,
believing this too infringed his property rights. 58
Figure 32.
Antoine Claudet, Portrait of a Man, sixth plate in Adelaide Gallery case, in
1842–1846, 2¾ x 3¼ in. Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image
courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 33.
Alfred Barber, Portrait of a Man
(shown in case), ninth plate in
luxury pack, 1841–1843, 2 x 2½ in.
Collection of Steve Edwards.
Digital image courtesy of Steve
Edwards.
Figure 34.
Alfred Barber, Portrait of a Man (shown out of case), ninth plate in
luxury pack, 1841–1843, 2 x 2½ in. Collection of Steve Edwards.
Digital image courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 35.
Edward Holland(?), Portrait of
Mathew Todd and his Daughter
Emily (Matthew Todd was an Inn
Keeper in York), ninth plate, 1843
or 1844, 2 x 2½ in. Collection of
Steve Edwards. Digital image
courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 36.
Edward Holland(?), Portrait of Mathew Todd and his Daughter Emily
(Matthew Todd was an Inn Keeper in York) showing label on case, ninth
plate, 1843 or 1844, 2 x 2½ in. Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image
courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Beard’s legal cases reveal the limits of seeing photographs, or photographic
cases, as material things, independent of social relations or structures of
power. This focus on objects in law seems a fruitful way of considering the
production of subjects in case histories, particularly those subjects known as
authors, artists, or photographers. I have in mind the particular form of case
history known as the history of photography, but the implications are much
wider than this. For instance, unlike much recent work on performativity, self-
making, or self-fashioning, attention to this legal history shines a light on the
“unfashioning” of the self. This is not only an account of success stories, we
should equally attend to those persons who were denied
biographies—blocked from working with photography and lost from history.
Cultural historians need to attend to barred or obstructed performances.
Property law prohibits performance as much as it produces it.
Some historians have argued that self-possession entailed a subject
modelled on property claims, but this is not quite right for the period of the
daguerreotype under consideration here because, at the time, self-
possession required actual property ownership. 59 Freedom and
independence, respectability and authority, class and gender were entwined
in this conception of representation through property. Beard frightened away
or prohibited unauthorised users and women were excluded from making
daguerreotypes under the laws of coverture. To take just this last point, prior
to the Married Women’s Property Acts of 1870 (amended 1874 and 1882),
married women were not considered as distinct legal entities. 60 In the words
of Blackstone: “By Marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law:
that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband”. 61 Married women were deemed to be “represented” or “covered”
by their husband and they were not at liberty to enter into legal contracts. As
such, the femme couvert, as the married women was known, could not make
licence agreements with Beard. Feminist historians have examined the scope
for action available to women under such restricted legal circumstances,
showing that some room for manoeuvre was actually possible; what they do
not refute is the exclusive character of legal contracts. 62 We know of two
prominent female Beard licensees, both were femme sole, or “uncovered”
women: Miss Jane Nina Wigley and Mrs Anne Cooke, who was a widow. It is
said that Beard sorely regretted licensing Wigley, when she began
advertising as the maker of the best large, coloured daguerreotypes. 63 In
the last years of the patent other women were operating studios: more
research is needed to establish the conditions under which they worked the
invention. 64 One issue is that the work of Wigley and Cooke remains largely
invisible today because the cases housing their daguerreotypes were
unmarked or carry the features of Beard Patentee, so even the works of the
uncovered women are subsumed in his collective authorship.
To escape Beard’s territorial monopoly, some would-be photographers
immigrated to places as near as Scotland or the Channel Islands and as far
as the USA and Brazil. At least two daguerreotypists took to crime to find a
space for themselves: John Henry Greatrex forged £1,300 in banknotes and
fled to New York. 65 Unfortunately for him, he was returned by the American
authorities and received a sentence of hard labour, dying in custody. Richard
Lowe, who ran a high-end daguerreotype establishment in Cheltenham,
employed his credit worthiness to obtain expensive items of plate and other
valuables (Figs 37 and 38). He then boarded a Liverpool steamer and sailed
away, never to be seen again on UK shores. 66 Taking another route, Jabez
Hogg—an operator and legal witness for Beard, who subsequently emerged
as a strong opponent of the patent restriction—became an eminent
ophthalmologist and writer on eye diseases. J.F. Goddard, Beard’s chief
chemist and legal witness, ended his days as a pauper living in an
almshouse. 67 Are these people’s stories less important than the acclaimed
daguerreotypists known from the history books?
Figure 37.
Richard Lowe, Portrait of Ann Elizabeth Griffith (showing case),
hand-coloured quarter plate in Promenade, Cheltenham case,
1855, 3¼ x 4¼ in. Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image
courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 38.
Richard Lowe, Portrait of Ann Elizabeth Griffith (showing photograph in
case), hand-coloured quarter plate in Promenade, Cheltenham case, 1855,
3¼ x 4¼ in. Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve
Edwards.
This consideration of the legal ramifications of objects and authorship brings
a different slant to recent ideas concerning objecthood. Materialism is again
receiving a great deal of attention, largely as a reaction against the
“linguistic turn” that dominated cultural theory during the long 1980s and, in
some fields, still does so. In the work of the “new materialists” and object-
oriented thinkers, attention falls on things or human/non-human hybrids and
the networks they shape. At its best, work of this type encourages scrutiny of
objects that have escaped attention. This can involve considering the
mediating role of objects, which may or may not be commodities, in
cementing social networks (the anthropologists’ approach) or demonstrating
how simple forms—paper, folders, and labels—or more complex
instruments—whether microscopes or cloud chambers—constitute “artefacts
of knowledge”. Fine-grained descriptions of objects, how they are made and
used, or the connections they enable, are clearly of importance to art
historians. 68 The problems arise from the meta-theoretical claims posited by
the new materialists: the argument against “critique”; the idea of the
“agentic object”; or the advocacy of a “flat ontology”. All these propositions
are theoretically unconvincing and politically disabling. 69 What is more, the
approach erases crucial dimensions of objects and their role in human
affairs.
Taking daguerreotype object-image amalgams as the specimens in question,
here I focus on the way that historians of culture, science, and technology
working on patents, and often drawing on the work of Bruno Latour and Actor
Network Theory, have claimed that intellectual property is not a species of
property but a grant or conventional gift. 70 This move is made to secure a
particular understanding of objects. This is a “physicalist” conception of
materialism, which involves attention to matter or objects independent from
social relations. 71 For the historians of patents influenced by the new
materialism, property must be a physical possession and immaterial
artefacts, created by the law, cannot be deemed property; only immovables
or chattels seem to count. However, the distinction between property and a
grant or gift does not hold because property is always a legal category and
all property—real, chattel, and immaterial—is edged around with “rights” or
legal conditions. In a sense, all possession is a grant or an artificial “right”,
sanctioned by law and ultimately guaranteed by state force. Land ownership
was subject to primogenitor, entail, dower, or thirds; it could be confiscated
in cases of treason and, if an owner died intestate, it returned to the crown.
Immaterial property is granted for a specific duration, but so are leasehold
properties. In English law, an apartment is subject to a leasehold agreement
limited to portions of time. Is an apartment not property? A clerical living was
also immaterial and fixed for a number of years, so was an assignment of
lands, or, in the case of office holders, the right to take fees or emoluments.
You are restrained from doing just what you like even with some forms of
chattel property, be they heirlooms, enslaved people, or livestock. Married
women could not possess any of these things, with the exception of personal
heirlooms. As C.B. MacPherson helpfully put it, all forms of property exist “as
a right, not a thing: a right in the sense of an enforceable claim to use or
benefit of something”. 72
I opened by claiming that daguerreotypes were things: image-object
amalgams, but this definition now has to be further qualified. 73
Daguerreotypes are immaterial things or, perhaps, better put, their
objecthood is intrinsically embedded in the law of immaterial property.
Stated the other way around, daguerreotypes are forms of immaterial
property embodied in physical objects, just like patent pills. Beard’s cases
are simultaneously physical and immaterial things; they are objects
encrusted with social relations. The features of the daguerreotype with which
I began: embossed mats, stamped cases, marked ormolu frames and rings,
cast and pressed pans, paper signatures, labels, and marked plates were
introduced when Beard’s patent was a matter of legal contention. The author
“Beard Patentee” migrated from one surface to another. These features are
integral to daguerreotype objects as authorial trappings and claims to
property. They mark ownership and authority under specified territorial
borders, enforced by the institutions of the state. They assert Beard’s
control, his property, and his authorship and, just as significantly, they
represent closures of possibility for others. A flat ontology cannot account for
this “tactile archive” and any account of networks of actors that sidesteps
hierarchies of property and capital—racialised and gendered capitalism, or
the nation state—is analytically purblind and descriptively weak. All physical
things exist in and through the structures of nation states, or inter-state
arrangements and their laws. It is not possible to separate physical objects
such as cases from social relations, or property claims embodied in legal
cases. Some of the photographers whom Beard prosecuted found ways
around the restrictions—Egerton, Barber, Mayall—but most did not. Holland,
Chapple, and Rankine Bake were shut down and denied the opportunity to
fashion themselves and we have no idea how many others were put off by
instructions from Beard’s legal representatives. These men were not allowed
biographies. Those who continued to work in the daguerreotype trade were
heavily constrained in what they could do and their cases provide constant
reminders of Beard’s control and his property. His cases are legal objects that
proclaim his property right. Treating daguerreotypes as pictures misses this
important dimension of their history, but an account of these things as
objects that does not attend to property relations involves a different kind of
clouded vision.
Object Cases as Legal Objects
In conclusion, let us return to object cases, with the understanding derived
from André Jolles and tracked through the law courts of the 1840s, that these
items are legal judgements or norms taken on physical form. After 1846,
daguerreotype studios emerged proclaiming the names of makers on cases
and mats. While this was possible in the territories of Britain outside Beard’s
control—Scotland, Ireland, and the Channel Islands—before this date, this
was unusual in the area covered by his patent, but there are at least two
instances in which licensees stamped cases with the studio name or address;
these are the “Photographic Studio—Salop” and the Manchester studio at
Ducie Place, subsequently the Royal Exchange, run by Mr Watson, John
Johnston, and then the brothers William and John Akers (Figs 39 and 40). The
status of these establishments is uncertain, but almost certainly they existed
as part of Beard’s business network. The situation changed in around 1846,
when cases and mats were more regularly marked with maker’s details. This
case-event might be characterised as the rise of the “names” known to
photographic history. Not much is understood about the legal arrangement
by which they operated. However, the lack of secure information has not
prevented some loose speculation, suggesting that Beard’s legal hold on his
territory was failing. Historians of photography have insinuated that he over-
reached himself with expensive prosecutions, bringing on his bankruptcy of
1849. It is sometimes claimed that he ceased to pursue infringements of his
property in the later 1840s, finally leaving the field open to natural talent.
Freed from constraint, it is said, photography was finally able to begin its
inevitable ascent, as if it were there all the time pupating. 74 This story of
Beard’s bankruptcy makes for a nice Whig-Liberal morality tale binding taste
and personal liberty to laissez-faire economics. In this romance, Beard
receives his just punishment for restraining the rise of photography and
sullying “Art” with commerce. Unfortunately, for the advocates of this
ideological story, none of it is true.
Figure 39.
John Johnson(?), Portrait of a Woman (showing case), hand-
coloured ninth plate in “Ducie Place, Manchester” case,
1842–1844, 2 x 2½ in. Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital
image courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 40.
John Johnson(?), Portrait of a
Woman (showing photograph in
case), hand-coloured ninth plate
in “Ducie Place, Manchester”
case, 1842–1844, 2 x 2½ in.
Collection of Steve Edwards.
Digital image courtesy of Steve
Edwards.
The details of Beard’s bankruptcy case reveal something very different. In
October 1849, Beard received a bankruptcy ruling but, in June 1850, he was
issued a second-class certificate. 75 This means that, while the court ruled he
was partially to blame for his debts, he had settled with his creditors.
Throughout the middle of the century, small businesses were notoriously
under-capitalised and volatile; typically, a proprietor might expect to trade
for two or three years. 76 Bankruptcy was very common during the time, but
Bread’s period of insolvency lasted for, at most, seven months. He probably
needed to realise some assets to settle his debts and we need to know more
about his creditors, but it is also possible that Beard’s bankruptcy was a
financial ruse; it certainly needs looking into with a critical attitude.
Interestingly, he was listed in all of the bankruptcy dealings not as
photographer but as “metalic plate and picture frame manufacturer”, giving
his address as Milman Mews and 34 Parliament Street. 77 This may indicate
that he had transferred the studios to his son Richard Beard Junior. In the
month that Beard filed for bankruptcy, Beard Jr. reopened the studio in
Cheltenham, which had been vacant since 1844; subsequently, the license
was resold to Lowe. 78 In 1848, Beard Jr. “repurchased the Licence” for
Liverpool and, in the following year, opened the studio at 34 Church Street in
that city. 79 Whether or not the Beards employed this legal ruse, in the 1851
census, Richard Beard senior was again listed as “photographic artist” and
he continued to live on the fashionable Mecklenburgh Square until 1852. 80
During the mid-1850s, Beard was in partnership with Foard in Liverpool and
Manchester (Fig. 41). Parkinson, Beard & Co artists worked in Manchester
and Ashton-Under-Lyne in 1854 (this may have been Beard Jr.). 81 There is no
indication that he surrendered the daguerreotype patent and Beard’s
certificate of death lists him as “gentleman”, a period term designating a
person who did not work, but who received an income from investments. 82 It
is likely that he followed the standard economic pattern for middle-class men
at the time, moving from high yield but high-risk manufacturing or trade to a
rentier existence as soon as investments were sufficient to yield 5 per cent.
83 Having accrued enough capital, middle-class men tended to retire from
active business life and invest their energy and time in charitable works,
religious associations, or civic politics. I doubt Beard was any different, but
locating photography in the story of “Art” makes it difficult to account for the
choices he and others made.
Figure 41.
Beard & Foard, Portrait of a Man, hand-coloured ninth plate in case,
1854–1855, 2 x 2½ in. Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image courtesy
of Steve Edwards.
Whatever the truth of the “bankruptcy story”, the evidence suggests that
Beard persisted with his existing business model of licensing studios,
extending this approach to London, in the later 1840s. In the first instance,
the proof comes from cases and frames. The Science and Media Museum
collection contains several daguerreotypes, made in Sussex, probably during
the 1850s, by the monumental sculptor and sometime daguerreotypist,
Thomas Thurlow. What is striking about them is that they are presented in
“Beard Patentee” frames. It would be possible to suggest that he was using
old stock, but there are other examples. On the back of a striking portrait of
a man, there is a large paper label announcing Cornelius Sharp’s studio at
London Bridge, also dating from 1846 to 1848 (Figs 42 and 43). There are
two things to observe on this frame: first, Sharp’s label proclaims that these
are “Beard’s Patent Photographic Portraits” made “Under a License from the
Patentee”; and second, there is also a paper disc printed with the word
“Patentee” and signed “R Beard”. It is the only known example of this form of
Beard’s signature.
Figure 42.
Cornelius Sharp(e), Portrait of a Man with Column and Landscape
Background, in japanned papier mâché hanging frame with arched
mount and acorn hanging ring, quarter plate, 1846–1848, frame size:
7½ x 6 5/8 in. Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image courtesy of
Steve Edwards.
Figure 43.
Cornelius Sharp(e), Portrait of a Man with Column and Landscape
Background, in japanned papier mâché hanging frame with
arched mount and acorn hanging ring, quarter plate, 1846–1848,
frame size: 7½ x 6 5/8 in. showing reverse with a large label
containing the details of Sharp’s studio and a circular handwritten
“R Beard” signature, over printed “Patentee” (this is the only
known example of the signature disc). Collection of Steve
Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve Edwards.
One quarter-plate image by Barratt of Regent Street, made between 1846
and 1848, is suggestive of high-end work and is stamped on the case with
Barratt’s insignia (Figs 44–46). During this period, Barratt exclusively
employed the acclaimed miniature painter Monsieur Mansion for colouring
his daguerreotypes. Only four other studios in England were capable of
coloured work of this standard: J.J.E. Mayall, William Kilburn, and Antoine
Claudet, all working on Regent Street or the Strand, and John Akers in
Manchester. Arguably, Barratt’s specimen is superior to many
daguerreotypes by Kilburn. On this basis, Barrett should occupy a prominent
place among the names. Open up this daguerreotype, remove the plate
sandwich, and what do we find—a “Richard Beard Patentee” signature!
Another known Barratt daguerreotype in the St Albans Museum bears the
same studio insignia on the case and, under the plate, there is another Beard
signature label. These portraits by Barratt and Sharp pre-date the bankruptcy
proceedings of 1849, but they are important examples of the emergence of
named studios given as evidence for Beard’s slackening grip. Yet, case and
frame proclaim Beard’s control.
Figure 44.
Barratt, Portrait of a Girl with Flowers (showing case), hand-
coloured quarter plate in 22 Regent Street case, 1846–1848,
3¼ x 4¼ in., with a Beard Patentee signature under the plate.
Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve
Edwards.
Figure 45.
Barratt, Portrait of a Girl with Flowers (showing photograph in case), hand-
coloured quarter plate in 22 Regent Street case, 1846–1848, 3¼ x 4¼ in.,
with a Beard Patentee signature under the plate. Collection of Steve
Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 46.
Barratt, Portrait of a Girl with Flowers (showing Beard Patentee signature
under the plate), hand-coloured quarter plate in 22 Regent Street case,
1846–1848, 3¼ x 4¼ in., with a Beard Patentee signature under the plate.
Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Further evidence for this pattern of Beard’s continuing use of the patent and
strategy licensing of studios can be found in the regional press. To cite only
examples after Beard’s “bankruptcy”: as noted, in 1849 Beard repurchased
the licence for the Cheltenham studio, which he sold to Richard Lowe, who
traded there from 1850–1856, when he absconded. 84 Arthur Hall, was
“Licensed by the Patentee”, to work in Gloucester, 1849–1850. 85 George
Brown, made “Beard’s Photographic Miniatures” in Newcastle from
1850–1855. 86 William Pumphrey was “Licensee” in York in 1850 (Fig. 47). 87
J. and J. Blake ran a studio in Davenport from 1851 by “Queen’s Royal Letters
Patent”. 88 Frederick Worcester worked in Coventry in 1852 “by arrangement
with the Patentee”. 89 Thomas Chapman Browne operated his “Patent
Photographic Portrait Establishment” at Market Place, Leicester from
1852–1855 (Figs 48 and 49). M. Theodore Brunell, “Royal Coat of Arms”
advertised a “provincial tour” in 1853. 90 Of course, we know Nicolaas
Henneman purchased a license from Beard to supplement his work with
Talbot’s paper prints. From this evidence, we can see that Barratt and
Sharp—and almost certainly Thurlow—and these other men were still
working by Beard’s agreement. Despite the appearance of names on these
daguerreotypes, and in the history books, it seems that Beard retained tight
control. These “names” were licensees and it is likely that the commodity-
image-things they made were “Beard” daguerreotypes. It is a scandalous
proposition, but this may even be true for such celebrated photographers as
J.J.E. Mayall and Edward Kilburn (Figs 50 and 51).
Figure 47.
William Pumphrey, Portrait of a
Man, ninth plate, circa 1850, 2 x
2½ in. (the maker’s mark is
embossed on the mat).
Collection of Steve Edwards.
Digital image courtesy of Steve
Edwards.
Figure 48.
T. Chapman Brown, Portrait of a Man (showing
case), hand-coloured ninth plate, later 1840s, 2 x
2½ in. Red-leather flip-top case stamped: “T
Chapman Browne, Bible & Crown, Market Place,
Leicester”. Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital
image courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 49.
T. Chapman Brown, Portrait of a
Man (showing photograph in
case), hand-coloured ninth
plate, later 1840s, 2 x 2½ in.
Red-leather flip-top case
stamped: “T Chapman Browne,
Bible & Crown, Market Place,
Leicester”. Collection of Steve
Edwards. Digital image courtesy
of Steve Edwards.
Figure 50.
J.J.E. Mayall, Portrait of a Woman with Flowers (showing case), hand-
coloured sixth plate, circa 1854, 2¾ x 3¼ in. Collection of Steve
Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 51.
J.J.E. Mayall, Portrait of a Woman with Flowers (showing photograph in
case), hand-coloured sixth plate, circa 1854, 2¾ x 3¼ in. Collection of
Steve Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Coda: The Case of Antoine Claudet
Now the final case or, to be precise, four of them (Figs 52–59). This is a set of
four portraits by Antoine Claudet—they are versions of the same man and
woman and may have been betrothal portraits (no wedding ring is visible).
The date “1843” is scratched on the back of one plate and that seems right.
There is much to say about the images, but I am interested in the cases.
Claudet was Beard’s main rival in the capital, but he was compelled by law to
pursue a distinct approach to business. His cases differ markedly from those
of Beard Patentee and indicate the extent to which these object-image
amalgams are legal constructions, as much as they are physical things. The
case interiors for these four portraits are all the same: a bluish-red velvet
pad and an etched matt. The cases are well made with hinges and superior
leather coverings, showing little sign of warping or splitting. Each case is also
unique. They vary in colour and surface decoration and the Adelaide Gallery
insignia is present on three but absent from the fourth. One portrait of the
man comes in a burgundy leather case with no decoration except the gilt
stamp: “Claudet’s ‘Daguerreotype Process’. Adelaide Gallery Strand”. The
form of this stamp is a band, or probably a broach, topped by the British
crown indicating royal patronage. The second male portrait appears in a calf-
brown case—perhaps it is a little redder than this suggests—with three
embossed bands at the border. The central panel again bears the gilt studio
stamp. Whereas the other three cases are equipped with double hook-and-
eye fasteners, this has only one positioned centrally. One picture of the
young woman is presented in an extraordinarily unusual green case. The
leather is mottled and it has the same bands at the edge. The central panel
contains an embossed cartouche design, which frames the Adelaide Gallery
stamp. The final case, also containing a portrait of the woman, is in a dark-
plum coloured mottled leather; again, there is the familiar bordering edge
with a distinct cartouche pattern, but significantly, it is not stamped with
Claudet’s studio insignia.
Figure 52.
Antoine Claudet, Portrait of a Man, with Elaborate Painted Background
(showing case), in red-domed case with embossed border and
Adelaide Gallery stamp, 1843, 2½ x 3¼ in. Collection of Steve
Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 53.
Antoine Claudet, Portrait of a Man, with Elaborate Painted Background
(showing photograph in case), in red-domed case with embossed border
and Adelaide Gallery stamp, 1843, 2½ x 3¼ in. Collection of Steve
Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 54.
Antoine Claudet, Portrait a Man, with Elaborate Painted Background
(showing case), in red-brown case with embossed border and
Adelaide Gallery stamp, marked on the reverse “1843”, 2½ x 3¼
in. Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve
Edwards.
Figure 55.
Antoine Claudet, Portrait of a Man, with Elaborate Painted Background
(showing photograph in case), in red-brown case with embossed border
and Adelaide Gallery stamp, marked on the reverse “1843”, 2½ x 3¼ in.
Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 56.
Antoine Claudet, Portrait of a Woman, with Elaborate Painted
Background (showing case), in unusual green-leather case with
decorative scroll design and Adelaide Gallery stamp, 1843, 2½ x 3¼
in. Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve
Edwards.
Figure 57.
Antoine Claudet, Portrait of a Woman, with Elaborate Painted Background
(showing photograph in case), in unusual green-leather case with
decorative scroll design and Adelaide Gallery stamp, 1843, 2½ x 3¼ in.
Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 58.
Antoine Claudet, Portrait of a Woman, with Elaborate Painted
Background (showing case), in brown-leather case with decorative
scroll (no stamp), 1843, 2½ x 3¼ in. Collection of Steve Edwards.
Digital image courtesy of Steve Edwards.
Figure 59.
Antoine Claudet, Portrait of a Woman, with Elaborate Painted Background
(showing photograph in case), in brown-leather case with decorative scroll
(no stamp), 1843, 2½ x 3¼ in. Collection of Steve Edwards. Digital image
courtesy of Steve Edwards.
A great deal of attention has gone into the pose of the figures, the lighting,
and selection of the background and the cases are well crafted, but Claudet
evidently did not set much stock by the regular presentation of his portrait-
commodities. This is important and it suggests a distinct business pattern. As
we have seen, the marks of authorship are fixed for the products of “Beard
Patentee”. The legal loophole that allowed Claudet to evade the patent came
with a particular qualification, restricting him to the use of “three complete
sets of apparatus”. 91 Unlike Beard, Claudet could not expand and conduct
multiple business outlets; in fact, he only ever ran two photographic studios
at any one time. Standardisation—even flexible production—was irrelevant to
his mode of operation. In this set of pictures, Claudet’s presentation varies to
the extent that one case does not even carry the studio’s insignia. For him,
taste and distinction mattered much more than consistency in case design.
The absence of noteworthy case features, or their irregular variation, should
also be understood as legally regulated characteristics of property.
Claudet’s particular approach to self-making meant that regularity and
standardisation were not central to his operation. He was able to fashion a
glittering career for himself, creating refined images and serving elite
customers; ultimately, he was made F.R.S. and received the Legion of
Honour. This, though, was not simply a matter of a superior artistic vision; it
was the strategy of an exception that emerged from a loophole in the law.
Historians of photography have perpetuated a simple misrecognition,
treating contrasting business strategies and legal opportunities (resources)
as if they were matters of “Art” or sensibility. 92 In part, they have done so
because they have not attended to cases, which, like all objects, are at once
physical and legal things.
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Warming World (London: Verso, 2018). Malm convincingly shows that environmental destruction cannot be addressed
without a distinction between humans and non-humans. Hylton White, presents an excellent account of Latour’s
failure to comprehend Marx on commodity exchange and fetishism in his essay “Materiality, Form and Context: Marx
Contra Latour”, Victorian Studies 55, no. 4 (2013): 667–682. Other suggestive critiques include: David Bloor, “Anti-
Latour”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 30, no. 1 (1999): 81–112; Noel Castree, “False Antitheses?
Marxism, Nature and Actor-Networks”, Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geography 34, no. 1 (2002): 111–146; Benjamin
Noys, The Persistence of the Negative: A Critique of Contemporary Continental Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2010); and Alberto Toscano, “Seeing it Whole: Staging Totality in Social Theory and Art”, The
Sociological Review 60, no. 1 (2012): 64–83.
For example, Alain Pottage and Brad Sherman, Figures of Invention: A History of Modern Patent Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010); and Stathis Arapostahis and Graeme Gooday, Patently Contestable: Electrical Technologies
and Inventor Identities on Trial in Britain (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2013). Both are good studies that reveal the role of
things in constituting legal definitions. Nevertheless, in my view the evasion of property relations leads to significant
contradictions.
Etienne Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx (London: Verso, 2007). Balibar criticises this conflation between materialism
and materials or property and things.
C.B. Macpherson (ed.), “The Meaning of Property”, Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1978), 3.
I want to avoid the term “hybrid” here, due to both its racist origin and the current Latourian resonances. Amalgam
comes from metallurgy and is less biological.
This is not unlike the account of the rise of capitalism that omits the violence of the “so-called primitive
accumulation” and imagines that, once the guilds and other feudal restrictions were removed, the market could
simply spread its resplendent wings.
Her Majesty’s Commissioners authorised a fiat of bankruptcy against Beard on 8th day of October 1849; see The
London Gazette, 28 December 1849, 3970. He was awarded the second-class certificate on 9 March 1850; see The
London Gazette, 7 June 1850, 1632.
Geoffrey Crossick and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (eds), Shopkeepers and Master Artisans in Nineteenth-Century Europe
(London: Routledge, 1984). Stana Nenadic’s work on small firms in Edinburgh indicates that between 1861 and 1891,
59 per cent of female firms and 55 per cent of male-run enterprises traded for less than three years. In the book and
paper trades, 62 per cent went out of business within three years; see Stana Nenadic, “The Small Firm in Victorian
Britain”, Business History 35, no. 4 (1993), 90.
The London Gazette, 28 December 1849, 3970.
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